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Abstract
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of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5531
According to World Bank policy, countries remain 
eligible to borrow from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development until they are able 
to sustain long-term development without further 
recourse to Bank financing. Graduation from the Bank 
is not an automatic consequence of reaching a particular 
income level, but rather is supposed to be based on a 
determination of whether the country has reached a 
level of institutional development and capital-market 
access that enables it to sustain its own development 
process without recourse to Bank funding. This paper 
assesses how International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development graduation policy operates in practice, 
investigating what income and non-income factors 
appear to have influenced graduation decisions in recent 
decades, based on panel data for 1982 through 2008. 
Explanatory variables include the per-capita income 
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of the country, as well as measures of institutional 
development and market access that are cited as criteria 
by the graduation policy, and other plausible explanatory 
variables that capture the levels of economic development 
and vulnerability of the country. The authors find that 
the observed correlates of Bank graduation are generally 
consistent with the stated policy. Countries that are 
wealthier, more creditworthy, more institutionally 
developed, and less vulnerable to shocks are more likely 
to have graduated. Predicted probabilities generated by 
the model correspond closely to the actual graduation 
and de-graduation experiences of most countries (such 
as Korea and Trinidad and Tobago), and suggest that 
Hungary and Latvia may have graduated prematurely—a 
prediction consistent with their subsequent return to 
borrowing from the Bank in the wake of the global 
financial crisis.  
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Introduction 
This paper investigates how income and non-income factors affect graduation from the 
IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).   While the Bank does have an 
income threshold for IBRD borrowing, there is no automatic graduation rule linked to per-capita 
income of the borrowing country.  According to World Bank policy, countries remain eligible to 
borrow from the IBRD until they are able to sustain long-term development without further 
recourse to Bank financing and until they have reached a sufficiently advanced level of development.  
The income threshold (currently $6725) is simply a trigger for the beginning of discussions on 
graduation, which then look beyond the income proxy to assess whether the country meets the 
criteria for graduation.  In contrast, eligibility for the World Bank’s concessional lending through 
IDA (International Development Association) is more tightly linked to per capita income, and with 
a few exceptions ends when a country exceeds a certain threshold (currently $1165).   
This paper assesses how IBRD graduation policy has operated in practice, by investigating 
what income and non-income factors appear to have influenced graduation decisions over the past 
three decades.  It does so through panel estimation for 1982 through 2008 on the graduation status 
of countries that were above the IBRD income threshold in those years.
1  Explanatory variables 
include the per-capita income of the country, as well as measures of institutional development and 
market access that are cited as criteria by the graduation policy, and other plausible explanatory 
variables that capture the levels of economic development and vulnerability of the country.  We also 
supplement the graduation analysis with an analysis of the correlates of levels of IBRD borrowing of 
the non-graduates. 
We find that, as expected, per-capita income is an important predictor of graduation:  each 
standard-deviation increase in log income increases the likelihood of graduating by about 4 
percentage points.  Thus even though all the countries in the sample are above the IBRD threshold, 
the greater the amount by which a country’s income exceeds the threshold, the greater the 
probability of graduation.  But in addition, after controlling for income, advances in the institutional 
development cited in the graduation policy are significant predictors of graduation.  Institutional 
development (as measured by indicators from the International Country Risk Guide and Freedom 
House) increases the probability of graduation.  A standard-deviation increase in either index 
increases the likelihood of graduating by about 2 percentage points.  Beyond these explicit criteria, 
we find other significant explanatory variables for graduation that are likely picking up other aspects 
of institutional development and ability to sustain development, including measures of the 
economy’s vulnerability.  These results are broadly consistent with the stated policy.   
With a relatively few variables, our graduation model is able to predict correctly the IBRD 
graduation status of a country in a high percentage of cases.  Predicted probabilities generated by the 
model conform closely to the actual graduation and de-graduation experiences of Korea and 
Trinidad and Tobago, among others, and suggest that Hungary and Latvia may have graduated 
                                                 
1 No country below the threshold has graduated from IBRD borrower status, which is why we restricted the estimation 
to that sample. 3 
 
prematurely – a prediction subsequently borne out by large recent loans to those countries intended 
to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis. 
To supplement the graduation analysis, we also analyze the possible determinants of the level 
of IBRD borrowing.  These results are largely consistent with the graduation results:  higher incomes 
are associated with lower levels of borrowing, as are (though less robustly) institutional development 
and better credit ratings.  These results suggest that the path to graduation is evolutionary rather 
than abrupt: the same factors that gradually reduce a country’s demand for IBRD loans also 
eventually lead it to graduate. 
Background 
“Graduation” refers to the Bank’s formal determination that a country has attained a certain 
level of development that renders it ineligible for new IBRD borrowing. It reflects the achievements 
of a country in reaching a certain level of development, management capacity, and access to capital 
markets.  The legal cornerstone for graduation is Article III, Section 4 (ii) of the IBRD’s Articles of 
Agreement.
2  It states that the Bank may guarantee or make loans if it is satisfied that, in the 
prevailing market conditions, a borrower would be otherwise unable to obtain the loan under 
reasonable conditions.  The other provision relevant to graduation is Article 1 (ii), which states that 
Bank financing supplements private investment when private capital is not available on reasonable 
terms. 
The graduation process has evolved over time.  A graduation threshold based on a country’s 
per-capita income was first proposed in 1973, by which point 13 member countries had already 
permanently ceased borrowing from IBRD.  The threshold value of gross national income (GNI—
referred to as GNP at the time) per capita, was set at $1,000 measured in 1970 prices, with 
provisions for annual adjustments to reflect changes in prices and exchange rates.  The Executive 
Directors approved a more comprehensive policy on graduation in 1982, with a clarification issued 
in 1984 (Shihata 2000).  The policy identifies two key factors on which to base the graduation 
decision:   
 
  A country’s level of development and overall economic situation 
  A country’s capacity to sustain long-term development without further recourse to the 
Bank’s financial resources 
Two substantive criteria underlie assessments of these conditions: 
  A country’s ability to access external capital markets on reasonable terms 
  A country’s progress in establishing key institutions for economic and social 
development 
GNI per capita is clearly correlated with these hard-to-measure criteria for graduation.  The 
1982 policy maintained use of the GNI per-capita threshold—updated to account for global 
inflation—as the benchmark for initiating an assessment of graduation by management. According 
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to the 1984 clarification, GNI (GNP) per capita is to be used as an indicator that a country has 
reached a level of development where it can sustain its development process without Bank lending.  
However, the 1984 Board statement also clarifies that a country’s attainment of the prescribed GNI 
benchmark does not automatically imply that it must graduate. Rather, it is merely a milestone for 
Bank management to begin reviewing the country’s development, its overall economic situation, and 
capacity to sustain a long-term development program.  Graduation is to take place only when the 
country has met the conditions and substantive factors listed above (Shihata 2000).   
This paper takes a positive approach to understanding graduation from IBRD—“positive” 
in the sense of describing actual behavior, as opposed to a normative approach that specifies how 
the graduation policy should operate.  Our approach is analogous to the positive analyses of 
government, which does not assume that government acts as a welfare-maximizing social planner, 
but instead analyzes how governments actually perform and what appears to motivate their behavior.  
In this case, the object is not to assess the merits of the official graduation policy of the Bank, but to 
analyze how it has been applied in practice.   
The current policy on graduation is highly flexible, in part because it is widely recognized 
that the income threshold is an imperfect proxy for the two criteria of access to capital markets and 
adequate institutions.   A flexible policy does not necessarily imply an inconsistent or non-
transparent policy, however.  It should be possible to identify a limited set of indicators of 
institutional development that—together with per-capita income—can explain past decisions on 
graduation and on pre-graduation IBRD borrowing.  The goal is to make observable these 
unobservable institutional factors that influence decisions on the continued need for engagement as 
IBRD borrowers. 
An alternative would be to survey Bank governors, senior Bank management, and senior 
government officials about the criteria that went into their decision-making about the timing of 
graduation.  For example, they could be asked whether they regarded the Atlas-based IBRD income 
threshold as an adequate measure of a country’s development progress, whether they took into 
account some other income measure (such as PPP-based measures), and how non-income factors 
entered into the graduation decision.  That approach has merit too, but our approach here has three 
advantages over it.  First, the decision-makers’ stated criteria may not match up directly with the 
criteria actually used.  Given that there is no explicit formula, the process of graduation may have 
been approached more as an art than as a science, once a country has already met the objective 
criterion of the per-capita income threshold, and that process may be hard to describe precisely.  
Second, this empirical methodology allows us to cover nearly three decades of graduation decisions, 
whereas an interview approach might not allow the same coverage.  Third, different actors in the 
graduation decision-making presumably had different criteria, or at least applied them differently, 
and it would be hard to know how to aggregate the interview responses.  By identifying the factors 
correlated with actual graduation, we are in effect using a revealed-preference approach to 
graduation that shows in practice how the preferences and views of the various actors—most 
notably, the Bank and the officials of the graduating country—were aggregated. 5 
 
Data and hypotheses 
Table 1 presents the list of the 25 countries that have graduated from the Bank since 1970. 
Six of these nations subsequently “de-graduated” or borrowed again.  The goal of this section is to 
identify the factors that help explain whether and when a country graduates from the IBRD. 
As noted above, discussion of graduation is not initiated until a country crosses the IBRD 
income threshold.  We therefore limit our sample to only those nations whose income at the time 
exceeded the threshold level. As a result, our annual data results in an unbalanced sample, because 
not every country that exceeded the threshold in a given year exceeded it in all years. The panel is 
further unbalanced due to some missing data. 
Graduation reflects the ability of a country to reach a certain level of development, 
institutional capacity, and access to capital markets. Since income is obviously a proxy for these 
factors—as reflected in the threshold trigger—wealthier nations should be more likely to graduate.  
The IBRD threshold is measured in current-dollar GNI per capita, so we take (the log of) the 
amount by which each country in the sample exceeds the threshold.   
The criterion of “progress in developing key institutions of economic and social 
development” is not given an explicit and detailed definition within the graduation policy.  There are 
references to “management capacity” and, more narrowly, to “economic management capacity” 
(Shihata 2000).  A reasonably good proxy for this concept is the “quality of the bureaucracy” 
indicator from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
3   
In the last 20 years, institutional accounts of economic development have broadened, as 
recognized in many World Bank reports (World Bank 2001; 2006).  World Bank (2006) provides a 
three-way classification of institutions for development: Bureaucratic Capability, Provision of Public 
Services (including regulation of firms and resolution of disputes), and National Checks-and-
Balances Institutions.  The   ICRG provides two additional indicators – on adherence to the “rule of 
law,” and extent of “corruption in government” – that, along with “quality of the bureaucracy,” 
proxy reasonably well for this broadened view of institutions for development.  Countries are rated 
on a 0-6 scale by ICRG on each of these three indicators, with higher values representing 
institutions more favorable to development.  We take the sum of the three ICRG variables as a 
composite indicator of Institutional Capacity.   
Empirical studies provide evidence that countries with higher ratings on these and similar 
indicators are associated with higher levels of investment and growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001; Knack and Keefer 1995).    Part of this statistical association may be due to reverse 
causation from strong economic performance to more positive assessments of institutional 
capability (for example, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2004).  This question is not 
                                                 
3 Similar indicators are available from the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) and other sources, but only the ICRG 
covers a large sample of countries going back to the early and mid-1980s. The World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments (CPIA) include several relevant indicators, but beginning only in the late 1990s, and only for 
countries that have not graduated.  They therefore cannot be used for explaining differences between graduates and non-
graduates.  Moreover, the CPIA ratings are publicly available only for IDA-eligible countries, and only from 2005 
onward.    6 
 
central in the context of graduation decisions, however, as all candidates for graduation have 
relatively high incomes already.  What matters instead is their “capacity to sustain a long term 
development program” [emphasis added] as reflected in part by “the extent of progress in 
establishing key institutions for economic and social development” (Shihata 2000: 496). 
A more cautious approach toward graduation is thus warranted for countries where this 
sustainability is in question – that is, where the country has a higher likelihood of falling back below 
the income threshold.  Relevant institutional indicators then are those associated with lower volatility 
in income levels and growth rates (Mobarak 2005; Quinn and Woolley 2001; Rodrik 1999).   
Rodrik (1999) emphasizes “institutions of conflict management” that he argues are 
particularly important following adverse shocks that often trigger distributional conflicts.  
Institutions of conflict management are those that “adjudicate distributional contests within a 
framework of rules and accepted procedures,” including “an independent and effective judiciary” 
and “an honest and non-corrupt bureaucracy.”  A stronger rule of law restricts the potential scope 
of redistribution, reducing the incentive and ability of social groups to make “opportunistic grabs” in 
countries with latent social conflicts.  As empirical proxies, Rodrik uses the ICRG indicators 
described above, as well as indicators of civil liberties and political freedoms produced by Freedom 
House, arguing that:  
Democratic institutions—political parties, elected representatives, free speech, and 
the like—can be viewed as the ultimate institutions of conflict management, in that 
they allow for differences among social groups to be resolved in a predictable, 
inclusive, and participatory manner (p. 395). 
Quinn and Woolley (2001) provide strong empirical evidence that democracies experience 
much less volatility in income growth than non-democracies, although average income growth is 
similar in the two groups.
4  Their explanation is somewhat different from Rodrik’s.  They argue that 
voters are risk-averse, and show that voters reward incumbent governments only modestly for 
growth, but penalize them severely for volatility.  This explanation is consistent with research by Sen 
and Dreze (1989), attributing India’s ability to avoid major famines (during a period when its average 
economic performance was weak) to its democratic institutions, including a free media.   Mobarak 
(2005) provides additional supporting evidence, showing that democracy causes reduced volatility 
rather than the other way around.  He argues that if policy makers “unilaterally set policies, the 
variance of policies and outcomes will generally be higher than if policies are chosen through 
consensus” by democratic procedures.  As noted by Henisz (2004) and others, checks on executive 
power tend to increase the stability of economic policy.   
We therefore use Political Freedoms as a second indicator of institutional development.  
Following Rodrik (1999), Mobarak (2005), and others, we base this indicator on the Freedom House 
measures of Civil Liberties and Political Rights.  The Civil Liberties index captures freedom of 
                                                 
4 Many cross-country time-series studies (for example, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994) conclude that the link between 
democracy and high per capita income is explained mostly by causation from income to democracy.   Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008) conclude from their analysis that there is no causal link between income and 
democracy, but that both are determined jointly by longer-run historical factors.       7 
 
expression and beliefs, freedom for association and organization, and protection from the state in 
political, civil, and criminal matters.  The Political Rights index captures free and fair elections, 
political pluralism, and government accountability.  Each ranking is measured on a 1-7 scale.  Our 
chosen proxy for Political Freedoms is the sum of the two rankings.  We have reversed the original 
scale to make them more intuitive, so that higher values represent more political openness.  (There is 
some conceptual overlap in Institutional Capacity and Political Freedoms; for example, both measure 
aspects of the rule of law.  Empirically, the two indexes are correlated at .46.)  As will be shown 
below, results obtained using the Freedom House Political Freedoms indicator are robust to using 
alternative measures of democracy and of constraints on the executive from the Polity data base.     
Institutional development as measured by our two indicators may affect the graduation 
decision through other channels, in addition to its implications for income volatility. In countries 
with greater Institutional Capacity and more Political Freedoms, growth is likely to be more inclusive, with 
the benefits of high incomes not confined to elites.  Knack (2002) shows that in more institutionally 
developed countries (as measured by ICRG indicators), growth in incomes is most rapid for the 
lower-quintile groups in the income distribution in each country.  Public resources are also likely to 
be used more effectively: revenues will be raised and expended in more efficient and equitable ways, 
producing higher-quality public services (see, e.g., Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008; World Bank 2003).  
Income inequality and human development are important outcomes in themselves; to the extent that 
higher-quality public services in health and education increase the human capital of workers, the 
likelihood that per-capita income will fall below the IBRD threshold will also decline.   
As a third indicator of institutional development, we include a transition economy dummy 
variable for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  For given 
income levels, their economic and social institutions for sustained market-based development were 
relatively backward in the early years of transition.  Engagement with the IFIs and other donors – 
particularly in the early transition years – focused on reform of legal, tax and other systems designed 
to produce a convergence with other European countries in economic and social institutions.  Based 
on this reasoning, we would expect transition countries to graduate later than others with similar 
incomes.  On the other hand, the desire to be like other European countries – including by joining 
the EU, OECD and NATO – could cause them to transition from borrower to donor status before 
other countries at similar income levels.  The net effect of these two potential influences of 
transition status on the likelihood of graduating could be positive or negative.     
Graduation is also supposed to depend on the country’s ability to access foreign credit 
markets. Actual borrowing or bond issuance would not be an ideal measure of access, however, 
because it depends not only on the country’s ability to borrow but also on its need or desire to do so.  
Instead, we measure the willingness for foreign markets to lend by Institutional Investor’s 
Creditworthiness ratings, based on a survey of economists’ and risk analysts’ perceptions of a 
country’s creditworthiness.  The ratings are on a 100-point scale, with larger values representing 
greater creditworthiness.
5  This indicator measures the risk of default on sovereign debt, which 
should be a good proxy for access “on reasonable terms” to private capital markets.  The graduation 
                                                 
5 Ratings are provided twice a year, in March and September.  We took the average of these.  We did not use sovereign 
bond ratings from rating agencies like Fitch and Moody’s because of the incompleteness of their coverage.  Early in our 
sample period, in particular, many countries were not rated.    8 
 
policy emphasizes the latter criterion, but the Bank’s Articles of Agreement require lending decisions 
to take into account a country’s ability to repay the loan.  
Finally, we consider the role of vulnerability to shocks that may reduce per-capita incomes.  
For a given level of measured income and institutional quality, countries that are more exposed to 
shocks seem less likely to meet the criteria for graduation.  If they were to graduate, they might be 
more likely to return to the Bank for assistance because of a realized shock, and so they may be less 
willing to graduate in the first place.  We include two measures of vulnerability to shocks in our 
analysis.  One is the degree of export concentration:  countries with exports concentrated in fewer 
products are likely to face greater volatility and to be more vulnerable to idiosyncratic exogenous 
shocks.  Concentration is measured using a Herfindahl index of export lines.   
A second measure of vulnerability is country size.  The Bank’s IDA classifies countries with 
under 1.5 million people as small states subject to higher vulnerability to natural disasters and 
macroeconomic shocks.  The same rationale may apply even to middle- or high-income small states.
6   
We therefore include an indicator variable for these small countries, with population data taken from 
the WB-WDI.    
In addition, we include one measure of actual shocks:  a dummy variable representing 
whether the country has suffered a systemic banking crisis within the previous 5 years.  Data for that 
variable are drawn from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
7 
All regressions control for a linear time trend.  This time trend could reflect the net effect of 
various factors, such as any tendency to interpret the graduation policy more or less stringently over 
time.  For example, if the IBRD was more capital-constrained in the 1980s than in the 2000s, it may 
have rationed lending and graduated the wealthier above-threshold countries sooner in that early 
period than in the later decade. This change would show up in our regressions as a negative time 
trend.        
A final variable in the base specification of the graduation regression measures the IBRD 
income threshold as a share of world average income.  The threshold is adjusted to account for 
inflation (i.e., reduction in the purchasing power of the US dollar), and so it increases over time.  It 
is not adjusted, however, for changes in real income. Most countries have experienced growth in real 
incomes, not merely in nominal incomes, over the 1982-2008 period.  As a share of mean income 
worldwide, therefore, the IBRD threshold has fallen in most years, and over the period as a whole.
8  
Whether this relative threshold value matters for graduation or not will depend on whether decision 
makers take into account a country’s relative income level, rather than just its absolute (real) income 
level.  If they do, then an above-threshold country may be less likely to graduate in years when the 
threshold that it has exceeded is low relative to world average income.     
                                                 
6 The minutes of the January 26, 1982, discussion of the graduation policy by the Bank’s Executive Directors reflect 
agreement that particular country circumstances, such as “the problems of small countries with narrowly-based 
economies,” should influence how soon a country graduates once it surpasses the income threshold (Shihata 2000).  
7 The same source provides similar data on debt crises and currency crises, but those turned out to be unrelated to 
graduation. For simplicity, we report only the results for banking crises.  
8 It is correlated with the linear time trend at -.78.  9 
 
Our dataset represents an unbalanced panel of annual observations from 1982-2008.  We 
choose 1982 as the starting year in part because the ICRG measures, which comprise our Institutional 
Capacity index, begin only in that year.  It is also the year the Board adopted a comprehensive version 
of the current graduation policy. 
The panel is unbalanced for several reasons. First, some countries were not IBRD members 
until well into the 1982-2008 period.  This applies not only to new countries such as those emerging 
from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but also to many other countries including 
Switzerland.  Second, because countries are not considered for IBRD graduation until they meet the 
income threshold, we restrict the sample to country-year observations in which the country’s income 
is above the threshold.  Sixty-six member countries exceeded the threshold at some point during our 
sample period, but many did not do so in every year in the sample period.  Third, several nations are 
missing data for certain variables in different years scattered throughout the sample time period.  We 
are left with complete data for up to 906 total country-year observations, from 55 nations.  Of these 
55 countries, 21 are high-income countries that graduated from the Bank before the graduation 
policy was initially formulated in 1973 (or never borrowed at all).  Arguably these countries were at 
very low risk of de-graduating throughout the 1982-2008 period, and their experience may have little 
relevance to those at higher risk.  We therefore check the robustness of our results by dropping 
these 21 countries from the sample, leaving up to 437 observations in this second, smaller sample. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables in both samples are presented in Table 2. The 
“graduate” variable shows that in 83 percent of the (country-year) observations in which the country 
exceeds the IBRD threshold, the country had graduated. However, that full sample (Sample 1) 
includes the high-income countries that never borrowed; without them (Sample 2), the ratio falls to 
65%. Similarly, in Sample 1 borrowing commitments occur in 9.1% of the country-year observations, 
compared to 18.8% in Sample 2. Average scores on Political Freedoms, Institutional Capacity and Credit 
Rating are lower, and banking crises more frequent, in Sample 2.     
Empirical results 
Factors predicting graduation 
Table 3 presents probit estimates using a dummy variable coded 1 for years in which the 
country was an IBRD graduate, and 0 otherwise.  The first column of results is for Sample 1, 
including high-income non-borrowers, while the second column reports results for Sample 2, which 
drops them.  Standard errors (in Table 3 and in all subsequent tables) are adjusted for non-
independence within country “clusters” of observations.   
Wealthier countries are significantly more likely to successfully graduate, as expected.  
Specifically, even among this sample limited to country-year observations that exceed the IBRD 
income threshold, graduation is more likely when income exceeds the threshold by a lot than by a 
little.  The marginal effect of income at the mean values for either Sample 1 or Sample 2 suggests 10 
 
that a standard deviation increase in log income increases the predicted probability of graduation by 
about 4 percentage points.
9   
The indicators for institutional development are both statistically significant and have the 
expected signs, in both samples.  That is, higher institutional capacity and greater political freedoms 
both contribute positively to the likelihood of graduation.  A standard-deviation increase in either 
index increases the predicted likelihood of graduating by about 2 percentage points.  These results 
suggest that despite their conceptual overlap, these indicators each independently measure some 
aspects of institutional development that matter to decision makers.
10     
Creditworthiness, as proxied by the Institutional Investor’s Credit Rating, also has a positive 
and (marginally) significant impact on predicted graduation in Sample 1.  A standard-deviation 
increase (about 15 points on the 0-100 scale) is associated with an increase in the probability of 
graduating of about 1.3 percentage points.  Creditworthiness has a positive but not significant 
coefficient in Sample 2.  
Shocks represented by recent banking crises (specifically, a crisis occurring in the last 5 years) 
reduce the likelihood of graduating by about 1.2 (Sample 1) or 1.5 (Sample 2) percentage points on 
average.  Similar variables were tested for debt crises and currency crises, but those were not 
significant predictors of graduating, and so for space reasons we did not include them in the tests 
reported in Table 3.   
Smaller countries (those with under 1.5 million population) are significantly less likely to 
graduate than other nations, as hypothesized.  The quantitative effect is about 1.3 percentage points.  
Export concentration, contrary to our hypothesis, is positively and significantly related to 
graduation.  An increase of about 0.18 on the 0-1 index increases the likelihood of being a graduate 
by about 1 percentage point.  This result is counterintuitive, as lack of diversity in export 
composition makes a country more vulnerable to terms of trade or (depending on the commodity) 
climate-related shocks.  A possible explanation for the result is that oil exporters are among the 
countries with highest concentration, and sentiment for lending to countries receiving large windfall 
revenues from natural resources may be relatively weak.
11 
We tested several other proxies for vulnerability to shocks, including terms of trade shifts, 
exports as a share of GDP, and agricultural value added as a share of GDP.  These were not 
significant predictors of graduation, and are not reported in the tables for space reasons.   
                                                 
9 Marginal effects in this section are calculated using the Stata dprobit command. 
10 When we test each component of Institutional Capacity separately, corruption turns out to be the strongest predictor of 
graduation, followed by rule of law, and then bureaucratic quality.  Of the two Political Freedoms components, results for 
civil liberties are somewhat stronger than for political rights.  These results are available on request from the authors.    
11 In 1975, the Bank decided to provide IBRD loans “only on an offset basis to oil producing countries in capital 
surplus”.  It is unclear how long this policy lasted.  Oil exporters were excluded from access to exceptional resources 
under the pilot Crisis Response Window in IDA15 (World Bank 2010).   11 
 
The transition dummy is not significant, a non-result that is likely due to two offsetting 
influences.  Of the 11 transition economies over the IBRD threshold by 2008, only seven had 
graduated.  All seven of these entered the EU in 2004, and graduated soon after (between 2004 and 
2008).  Two of these seven new graduates, Latvia and Hungary, quickly returned to the IBRD as 
borrowers in 2009, in response to the global financial crisis.  These events are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the transition economies were slow to graduate because they needed assistance from 
the IFIs in building institutions for markets: only EU members graduated (not Russia or Croatia), 
and only after entering the EU.  However, these events are also consistent with the hypothesis that 
some of these countries may have graduated too quickly, with EU accession interpreted prematurely 
as a signal that their transitions were complete.      
The time trend is negative and significant, meaning that a country with a given set of values 
for income, credit rating, and other variables was less likely to graduate in the 2000s than in the 
1980s.  The effect is quantitatively small:  with the passage of 8 additional years, the likelihood of 
being a graduate falls by 1 percentage point.  This negative trend likely reflects some combination of 
two factors.  First, IBRD lending volumes appear to have been more supply-constrained in earlier 
years of our sample period, and more demand-constrained in later years.
12  Second, there was an 
increased awareness later in the period of the importance of non-lending assistance in development, 
giving even countries that did not need financial resources more reason to stay engaged with the 
Bank.   
The time trend may also capture the steady decline in the value of the IBRD income 
threshold relative to average world income, a trend noted above. It is plausible that countries are 
more reluctant to graduate at the threshold—or that the Bank is more reluctant to graduate them—
given that the threshold no longer means as much. Yet although we control for changes from year 
to year in the ratio of the IBRD threshold to average world income, the time trend nevertheless 
remains significant and negative.  The coefficient estimate for the threshold-world income ratio itself 
is not significant.
13   
Results for Samples 1 and 2 are very similar for most variables, despite the large reduction in 
number of observations and countries in moving from the former to the latter.  Findings are 
therefore not highly sensitive to the inclusion of wealthy countries that had graduated prior to 1982.  
The most notable difference is for creditworthiness, which is marginally significant in Sample 1, but 
loses significance in Sample 2, where its coefficient drops in magnitude by nearly one-half.    
Predicted vs. actual graduation  
One way to assess the value of this revealed-preference approach to uncovering the 
determinants of graduation is to compare predicted graduation patterns with actual graduation 
decisions.  With the relatively few variables in Table 3, our graduation model is able to predict 
correctly the IBRD graduation status of a country in a high percentage of cases.  If instead of using 
                                                 
12 Supply constraints began to bind again during the global financial crisis, but only after the end of our sample period.  
13 When the time trend is omitted from the regressions, the most notable change is that the threshold-world income 
ratio becomes positive and highly significant—unsurprisingly, given the strong negative correlation between that ratio 
and the time trend.   12 
 
the model, we were to rely solely on the IBRD income threshold in predicting whether or not an 
observation in Sample 2 was a graduate, our prediction would be correct 65% of the time—because 
in 65% of observations, countries over the threshold had in fact graduated.  [The share rises to 83% 
if we include all high-income countries as well, in Sample 1.]  But once we incorporate the 
institutional variables, the specific income level, and other factors included in the model, we 
correctly predict 87.2% of the observations (or 93.7% when high-income countries are included).   
Korea and Trinidad and Tobago (see Figure 1) illustrate the predictive power of the model.  
Korea’s predicted probability of graduating rose rapidly from 1989-1996, peaking in 1996 just before 
its actual graduation in 1997.  It took out no new IBRD loans in either 1996 or 1997.  With the 
onset of the crisis in 1997, its predicted probability of being a graduate fell rapidly, and it in fact “de-
graduated” and borrowed heavily in 1998 and 1999.  Korea has not borrowed since 1999, and in the 
last several years, its predicted probability of graduation has risen to near 90%.  In 2010 it is officially 
joining the OECD-DAC group of aid donors.   
Trinidad and Tobago graduated in 1984, when its predicted probability of graduating was 
well over .5 but declining.  Crude oil prices were already well below their 1981 peak, and plummeted 
below $10 per barrel in mid-1986.  Per-capita income fell each year from 1982 through 1989, as oil 
prices fell and remained low until 1990.  Largely due to declining incomes, Trinidad and Tobago’s 
predicted probability of being an IBRD graduate fell to .10 by 1987.  Beginning in 1988 (and 
continuing through 2000), the country’s per-capita income had fallen below the IBRD threshold, so 
its predicted probability in our framework had effectively fallen to 0.  Consistent with the model’s 
prediction, Trinidad and Tobago began borrowing again from the IBRD in 1990, after taking out no 
new loans in the entire decade of the 1980s.          
Even some of the (relatively few) incorrectly predicted observations are quite instructive.  
Hungary and Latvia graduated in 2007, at a time when their predicted probabilities of graduation 
were both below 50 percent:  45 percent for Hungary and only 22 percent for Latvia.  Yet both 
countries had to return to the IBRD for financing after the (admittedly major) financial crisis hit in 
2008, raising the possibility that they indeed graduated too early.  By contrast, when Slovenia 
graduated in 2004 and the Czech Republic the next year, their predicted probabilities were both 
above 50 percent, at 82 percent and 59 percent respectively. Neither of those countries was driven 
to take Bank loans in the wake of the crisis.
14 
                                                 
14 The probit estimates of graduation underlying this figure implicitly assume that graduation and degraduation 
transitions are symmetrical—that is, that the same statistical relationship holds on the way up as on the way down.  One 
commenter noted that these two transitions are fundamentally different:  graduation tends to be a gradual process, while 
degraduation is typically a sudden result of an economic shock.  But the cases of Korea and Trinidad and Tobago in 
 
Figure 1 show that the predicted probability of graduation can also suffers a sudden large drop at the time of 
degraduation.  This correlation suggests that an assumption of symmetry is plausible.   
 13 
 
Alternative per-capita income measures 
 Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3 repeat the analyses from (respectively) columns (i) and (ii), 
but with one change.  In the first two columns, income is measured ex post, meaning that the income 
estimates for each year reflect the best available information as of 2009.  In many cases these ex post 
estimates represent a substantial revision from contemporaneous estimates.  If graduation decisions 
at the time were consciously based on the degree to which income was estimated to exceed the 
threshold, contemporaneous income data – the numbers available to policy makers and Bank 
officials at the time – may better explain statistically which countries graduate and when.  On the 
other hand, ex post estimates, which incorporate revisions based on information available only later, 
are presumably more accurate and thus better reflect whether or not a country was really ready to 
graduate at any given time.  Bank and government officials may have been operating on that reality 
as well as on the then-available official numbers.  Therefore, it is unclear which set of figures – 
contemporaneous or ex post – might better predict actual graduation decisions. 
Contemporaneous and ex post estimates are correlated at .96, but for some countries the gap 
is quite large.  Slovakia’s ex post estimates for 1993-2006 are much higher, with a gap of $730 in 1993 
growing to $2780 by 2006.  For the years 2000-2003, Slovakia’s income was under the IBRD 
threshold (by about $1200 on average) based on contemporaneous data, but over the threshold (by 
about $700 on average) based on ex post estimates.    
In the last two columns of Table 3, the sample of countries over the threshold is determined 
using contemporaneous income estimates.  The samples are slightly smaller than in the tests using ex 
post estimates:  revisions are in most cases upward rather than downward, so more countries were 
(believed to be) under the threshold based on contemporaneous data.  The results are nearly 
indistinguishable from those obtained using ex post estimates.  Income coefficients and their 
associated test statistics, and measures of goodness-of-fit (including percentage of correctly-
predicted cases) are very similar.  These results are consistent with an interpretation that both sets of 
estimates matter—the ones available to Bank and government officials at the time they were making 
decisions, and the ones that better reflect the country’s true income levels and thus readiness to 
graduate, other things equal. 
Logit results  
Column i in Table 4 reports the logit estimation counterpart to the probit results of column 
(i) in Table 3.  Results are very similar, for the model overall and for the significance of each variable.  
One advantage to logit over probit is that coefficients can be readily expressed as odds ratios, and 
these are reported in the table.  A 1-unit increase in Political Freedoms is associated with a 27% 
increase in the odds of being an IBRD graduate, compared to 35% for a 1-unit increase in 
Institutional Capacity, or a 5% increase for Credit Rating.  Odds ratios below one indicate a decrease 
in the odds, so the time trend odds ratio indicates that other things equal the odds of being a 
graduate drop by 22% per year.  
A second advantage of logit is that we can control for time-invariant influences using 
country fixed effects, for the limited number of countries in our data set with a change in their 14 
 
graduation status between 1982 and 2008.
15  Columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 4 report, respectively, 
random-effects and fixed-effects logit models.  Fixed-effects logit estimates are based only on the 14 
countries (accounting for 169 observations) for which in the dependent variable varies over time—
countries that either graduated or degraduated during our sample period.
16  In these random- and 
fixed-effects tests, Political Freedoms and Institutional Capacity (and export concentration) remain 
significant, with higher odds ratios than in regression 1.  Creditworthiness is significant (and 
positively associated with graduation) in random effects but not in fixed effects.  The time trend 
remains significant in both tests, with each passing year reducing the odds of graduating by more 
than 30 percent.  The banking crisis dummy is significant in fixed effects and positively associated 
with graduation.  However, this estimate is based on only a single crisis (Korea in 1997) in regression 
(iii), while the negative association of banking crises with graduation in our 55-country sample is 
based on 11 crises.  The small island dummy shows even less variation in the 14-country sample: its 
coefficient estimate in regression (iii) is based entirely on Oman, which had a population under 1.5 
million in its first year (1984) in the sample but over 1.5 million thereafter.  The transition dummy 
drops out of regression (iii) as it does not vary at all over time.
17             
Alternative institutional indicators 
As noted above, it is difficult to know how to operationalize the phrase “key institutions for 
economic and social development.”  In Table 5 we therefore test alternative institutional 
development indicators.
18  Regression (i) includes the democracy index from the Polity dataset, 
commonly used in political science research.  In contrast to the Freedom House indicator, the Polity 
index does not measure outcomes (such as individual rights) often associated with democracy, but 
focuses instead on democratic processes, particularly the methods used in selecting chief executives.
19  
Despite this difference, the two variables are correlated at .91, and results for the Polity index in 
column (i) are very similar to results for Political Freedoms in Table 3.  Its coefficient is positive and 
significant, and a standard deviation increase (about 4.5 points on the 0-10 scale) is associated with 
an increase in the probability of graduating of about 2 percentage points.   
Regression (ii) of Table 5 includes a different Polity variable, an index of executive 
constraints.  This index is very highly correlated (at .95) with the democracy index from the same 
source, so it is not surprising that it produces similar results.  A standard-deviation increase (about 
                                                 
15 Fixed-effects probit models cannot be estimated using conditional maximum likelihood, and unconditional fixed-
effects probit estimates are biased.   
16 The 14 countries are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Gabon, Hungary, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Oman, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Trinidad and Venezuela.  Barbados graduated in 1984 but is missing data on Institutional 
Capacity.  Bahamas graduated in 1989 but is missing data on Credit Rating until 2000.  Iraq de-graduated in 2003 but is 
missing data on income.   
17 A Hausman test prefers random over fixed effects estimation, when both are run using the same sample and 
specification.  
18 Regressions in this table are all based on the larger sample of observations (Sample 1), and use the ex post measure of 
per capita income.  However, we obtain similar results for the institutional variables if we switch to Sample 2 or to 
contemporaneous income data.   
19 Our main regressions, in Table 3, use the Freedom House indicator rather than Polity to preserve sample size.  Polity 
does not cover some small countries covered by Freedom House.       15 
 
2.5 points on the 1-7 scale) is associated with an increase in the probability of graduating of about 2 
percentage points.  Results on Institutional Capacity and other variables are affected very little by this 
substitution of Polity indicators for Freedom House.  
It could be argued that “institutions” should be limited to a narrower set most directly 
relevant for economic development, and that political institutions may influence graduation 
decisions only indirectly, if at all.
20  Accordingly, in regression (iii) we exclude the Polity indicators as 
well as Political Freedoms.  The main results from Table 3 still hold.  In particular, the coefficients on 
income and institutional ratings (ICRG) remain statistically significant and of a similar magnitude.  
In fact, the ICRG coefficient rises somewhat, presumably because of the substantial correlation 
between the ICRG and political ratings.    
Regression (iv) of Table 5 includes tax revenue as a share of GDP.  This measure is often 
called “tax effort” and interpreted as an indicator of administrative capacity (see for example 
Brautigam, Fjelstad, and Moore 2008).  Greater tax effort may encourage graduation through a 
second channel, separate from this “institutional” interpretation:  governments with access to higher 
tax revenues have a greater potential to reduce poverty through progressive expenditure and transfer 
programs.
21  We do not include tax effort in most of our regressions because it is available in a 
comparable series only beginning in 1990, and its inclusion cuts the sample size by nearly half.  
Despite the relatively small sample, its coefficient in regression (iv) is positive and significant.  A 
standard deviation increase in tax effort – about 8 percentage points – is associated with an increase 
in the probability of graduating of about 1 percentage point.  Results for tax effort are robust to 
inclusion in the regression of the Polity democracy index, in column (v) of Table 5.               
Regression (vi) includes a standard indicator of financial development, M2 (a measure of 
money supply) as a share of GDP, which is computed using data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics database.  Because missing data on M2/GDP reduces our sample size by more 
than one-third, we do not include this indicator of institutional development in our main tests in 
Table 3.  Its coefficient is positive and significant in Table 5, however, suggesting that financial 
institutions are among the social and economic institutions taken into account in graduation 
decisions.
22      
                                                 
20 According to the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement (Article IV, section 10): “The Bank and its officers shall not 
interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of 
the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions…”  Of course, 
political considerations may influence a member government’s own decisions with respect to graduating from the IBRD.      
21 Ravallion (2009) constructs an indicator of countries’ capacity to eliminate extreme poverty through income 
redistribution, measured in terms of the marginal income tax rates on the non-poor that would be required.  This 
indicator is available for only a very few countries with incomes exceeding the IBRD threshold, so we are unable to use 
it in our tests.       
22 A final variation on the credit rating and ICRG measures (not shown here) is to make use of lags.  One commenter on 
this paper suggested that the credit ratings and ICRG scores could reflect reverse causality:  a country’s graduation could 
cause raters to increase scores in the year of graduation.  For countries as developed and integrated into global markets 
as the typical new graduate, it seems unlikely that IBRD graduation is taken as providing much new information on the 
level of institutional development and creditworthiness.  Nevertheless, we tested the possibility by using lagged score 
rather than contemporaneous score.  In the case of both variables, lagging the variable one year made the coefficient 
both larger and more statistically significant, which may allay concerns about reverse causality. 16 
 
Additional income, human development, and interaction variables 
In each of the six regressions reported in Table 6, an additional variable is added to the 
model from the first column of Table 3, using the larger sample of observations and the ex post 
income measure.  The added regressor in each test is indicated in bold in the respective column 
headings, with the coefficient and t-statistic for the added regressor shown in bold in a row towards 
the bottom of Table 6.              
The added variable in the first column is (the log of) PPP-adjusted per-capita income.  If 
PPP-adjusted income is a better measure of living standards than income based on exchange rates, it 
may provide additional explanatory power in our graduation tests.  Results show it is in fact 
positively and significantly related to the probability of being a graduate.  Moreover, with its 
inclusion the coefficient on GNI per capita (based on exchange rates) falls and is no longer 
significant.     
The second and third columns add human development outcome indicators, as proxies for 
the broad concept of “economic and social institutions.”
23  Column (ii) adds a measure of 
educational attainment – average years of completed education for the population age 25 and over–  
from Barro and Lee (2010).
24  Column (iii) adds instead a health outcome indicator, infant mortality, 
that has reasonably good data coverage.
25  Neither of these human development outcome proxies 
for economic and social institutions turns out to be significantly related to the probability of 
graduation.  Column (iv) adds instead a gender equality indicator, the female labor force 
participation rate.  This variable is also not significant. 
  Column (v) adds income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient.
26  For a given level 
of average income, a higher Gini will tend to be associated with higher poverty rates.  Higher 
poverty in turn may be associated with a greater need for continued access to IBRD loans.  However, 
the regression coefficient for the Gini measure, while positive, is insignificant in Table 6.
27  
                                                 
23 The graduation policy does not define institutional development explicitly, but an unpublished 1982 memorandum to 
the Executive Directors describes as an example of institutional weakness “countries that have recently experienced 
rapid increases in real income because of improved terms of trade or new mineral discoveries” but with “social 
indicators such as health and education levels [that] are often much lower than in other countries at the same income 
level.” The same memorandum implies that a failure to address development disparities between groups or regions 
within a country reflects institutional weaknesses.   
24 Data retrieved from the World Bank EdStats database.  Barro and Lee provide estimates only for every fifth year 
between 1970 and 2010, so we linearly interpolate for the years in between.  Results are very similar to those reported 
here if we treat the in-between years as missing data.    
25 Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  
26 Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  Other measures of income equality (e.g. 
income share going to the middle quintile) or inequality (e.g. share going to the top decile or quintile) produced similar 
results.   
27 Inequality changes slowly over time in most countries, so results in Table 4 are based on the country average values 
for Gini, from all available data over the 1982-2008 period.  If we instead use the annual values and drop all years with 
missing data, the available sample is far smaller, and Gini is again not significant.  Similarly, poverty headcount measures 
are available only for a very small number of annual observations, and we do not take period averages for poverty 
headcount because it often exhibits strong variability over time within countries.      17 
 
Column (vi) adds an interaction term, equal to the product of Credit Rating and the time trend.  
Middle-income countries had increasing access to funds raised on private capital markets over the 
1982-2008 period (Ceballos, Didier, and Schmukler 2010), so their creditworthiness – measured by 
the perceived likelihood that sovereign debt obligations will be honored – may have become more 
relevant to graduation decisions later in the period.  The positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term is consistent with this hypothesis.
28      
One institutional and governance variable that we are not able to use in our model variations 
is the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Analysis (CPIA).  CPIA scores are available only 
for non-graduates, and so cannot be used for a probit to explain graduation status.  But looking at 
the data permits us to answer the question of whether there appears to be a “threshold level” of 
average CPIA score above which graduation is likely.  The CPIA indicators have been defined 
consistently since 1998, and over that period seven countries (all in Eastern and Central Europe) 
have graduated, all between 2004 and 2008.  On a scale of 1 to 6, their average CPIA score a year 
before graduating was 4.9, with a range of 4.4 to 5.5.  By comparison, the above-threshold countries 
that had not yet graduated had an average score of 4.2 in these years, with an average minimum 
score of 2.4 and an average maximum of 5.2.  In every case but two, some non-graduate had a CPIA 
score exceeding that of the new graduate.  So while there is no single threshold CPIA level that is 
necessary and sufficient for graduation, countries this decade have not graduated without relatively 
high CPIA scores. 
29      
We also considered the possible relevance of political economy explanations for World Bank 
decision making.  Specifically, we tested for the impact of temporary UN Security Council 
membership on graduation.  Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009) find that temporary members of 
the UNSC receive more World Bank projects, although loan size is unaffected.  One interpretation 
of this finding is that large donor countries represented on the Bank’s Executive Board may 
sometimes approve loans in exchange for favorable votes in the UNSC.  However, we believe this 
argument has little relevance to graduation decisions, which have been largely consensual in practice, 
although the Executive Directors have the authority to graduate a country involuntarily (Shihata, 
2000).  Consistent with this view, a dummy for temporary UNSC membership falls far short of 
significance when added to our graduation regressions.
30           
                                                 
28 Calculating coefficient estimates and standard errors for Credit Rating conditional on different years (i.e. the time trend 
variable), we find negative but insignificant point estimates for 1982 through 1989; with positive estimates thereafter, 
becoming significant at the .10 level in 1996 and at the .05 level in 1998.  Results on Credit Rating shown in the table are 
conditional on the average value (1997) of the time trend variable.   
29 CPIA ratings for individual IBRD countries cannot be made public under Bank policy, which is why only aggregates 
are reported here. 
30 Results available on request.  Similarly, voting compatibility with the interest of major donors in the UN General 
Assembly does not help explain graduation decisions.  Kilby (2006), among others, finds evidence that the geopolitical 
interests of large donor countries, as proxied by General Assembly voting patterns, affect aid allocations of some 
international financial institutions.    18 
 
Factors predicting borrowing 
One way of assessing how above-threshold countries approach graduation is to see what 
factors predict their reliance on the IBRD for finance.  While non-graduates retain their eligibility for 
borrowing, a country that has not graduated does not always borrow in any given year.  Among the 
154 country-year observations in our main sample for which a country had not graduated, new 
borrowing commitments were made 78 times.  We therefore analyze also whether the factors 
predicting graduation also help to explain the decision to borrow or not, and how much the country 
borrows.    
Table 7 presents probit estimates where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for 
borrowing, and 0 for not borrowing in that year.  If the same factors are at play for graduating as for 
borrowing, the coefficient estimates in Table 7 should be of opposite sign as for Table 3.  Results 
for Sample 1 are shown in the first two columns, and for Sample 2 in the third column.   
Results are generally consistent with the graduation results.  Non-graduates with higher GNI 
per capita are markedly less likely to borrow from the IBRD, perhaps because as incomes rise, 
countries gain access to more capital from private sources.  As shown in column (ii) of Table 7, PPP 
measures of income have additional predictive power:  even controlling for GNI per capita, 
countries with higher PPP income (GDP) per capita are less likely to borrow.  In general, 
institutional capacity, political freedom, and creditworthiness are associated with a lower likelihood 
of borrowing from the IBRD, although these effects are not always statistically significant.  The 
results also show that over time, the likelihood of IBRD borrowing by non-graduates in any given 
year has grown.  As shown in column (iii), these results hold even when the high income countries 
that never borrowed are dropped from the sample.
31 
Findings are somewhat different in Table 8, where the dependent variable is (the log of) 
lending per capita.
32  The first column shows results for Sample 1.  As expected, non-graduates with 
higher incomes borrow substantially less per capita, and by extension borrow less as a share of their 
income.  This finding is consistent with the story that wealthier countries have more opportunities 
to access private financing.  Greater institutional capacity and political freedoms also appear to be 
associated with less borrowing per capita, but these results are mostly not statistically significant.  By 
contrast, the country’s credit rating is a strong predictor of the amount borrowed: countries with 
better credit ratings borrow significantly less from the IBRD.  Over time, the use of IBRD financing 
measured on a per-capita basis has risen, although this reflects increases in nominal price levels. 
                                                 
31 In contrast to the case with graduation, when we analyze borrowing the random effects logit model fails to achieve 
convergence.   
32 Borrowing is observed in only 82 country-year observations (for Samples 1 and 2), so tobit estimation is used, treating 
non-borrowing observations as censored at zero.  The log of borrowing is undefined when borrowing is zero, so we use 
the formula log((per capita IBRD lending + .01)/.01) to retain these observations in the sample with a value on the 
dependent variable of zero.  19 
 
Column (ii) reports results from a random-effects tobit model.
33  In general, results are very 
similar to column (i).  A notable exception is that the positive time trend is no longer significant 
when using random effects.    
Column (iii) follows the method and specification for column (i), but for Sample 2 instead of 
Sample 1.  Results based on this smaller sample of borrowers are nearly identical to those for the 
larger sample.    
Columns (iv) and (v) of Table 8 present results on lending per capita for expanded samples.  
(Summary statistics for these expanded samples are presented in Table 9.)  Sample 3 expands on 
Sample 1 by adding all country-year observations with per-capita incomes exceeding the IDA 
operational cutoff.  Some of these observations are technically eligible for concessional IDA loans, 
despite having incomes over the IDA cutoff, for example because of the exception for small island 
economies.  As shown in column (iv), income and creditworthiness remain significant in this sample, 
although with diminished coefficients relative to results for Samples 1 and 2.  In this expanded 
sample, we can add a dummy for observations over the IBRD threshold (in samples 1 and 2 all 
observations were over it).  The coefficient for this dummy is negative and significant, indicating 
(unsurprisingly) that countries over the notional threshold borrow less.  We can also control for the 
volume of IDA borrowing per capita in this test.  Lending from these two sources appears to be 
substitutes: more IDA borrowing is negatively associated with IBRD borrowing. 
Sample 4 expands on Sample 3 by adding in observations below the IDA income cutoff.  
Results on income per capita, IDA borrowing, and the over-IBRD-threshold dummy in this sample 
(with results reported in column (v) of Table 8) are all similar to results in column (iv).  There are 
several notable differences in results using Samples 3 and 4.  First, institutional capacity is significant 
in column (v).  Second, creditworthiness is insignificant.  Third, the transition dummy is positive and 
significant.  Fourth, we add a dummy for observations over the IDA income cutoff.
34  Per-capita 
IBRD borrowing is higher for these observations than for those below the IDA cutoff, even when 
controlling for the volume of IDA borrowing.         
Overall, the similarities in results for borrowing and graduation outweigh the differences, 
and the same variables that predict a greater probability of graduation also tend to predict reduced 
likelihood of borrowing from IBRD and reduced amounts borrowed.  Because the most likely 
graduates—high-income countries with strong institutions and credit ratings—are also attractive 
low-risk borrowers from the standpoint of the Bank’s balance sheet, it is unlikely that the reduction 
in borrowing is driven by unwillingness of the Bank to lend to these countries.  Therefore, these 
results are consistent with a graduation model that is evolutionary rather than abrupt:  the same 
factors that gradually reduce a country’s demand for IBRD loans also eventually lead it to graduate.  
                                                 
33 Fixed-effects tobit models (similarly to probit) cannot be estimated using conditional maximum likelihood, and 
unconditional fixed-effects tobit estimates are biased.   
34 Data on the IDA operational cutoff threshold begin only in 1987, so the period covered is 1987-2008. 20 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented what is to our knowledge the first attempt to model 
empirically the correlates of IBRD graduation.  Under Bank policy, graduation from the IBRD is not 
an automatic consequence of reaching a particular income level, and the IBRD per-capita income 
threshold is used only as a trigger to initiate discussions about the country’s readiness.  Graduation is 
instead supposed to be based on a determination of whether the country has reached a level of 
institutional development and capital-market access that enables it to sustain its own development 
process without recourse to Bank funding.   
We assess how this policy is implemented in practice through a panel analysis of 55 countries, 
including 34 countries that were IBRD borrowers at some time since 1970.  We find that the 
observed correlates of Bank graduation are generally consistent with the stated policy.  Among the 
countries that have crossed the IBRD income threshold (currently $6725), those that are wealthier, 
more institutionally developed, and are less vulnerable to trade, financial, and other shocks are more 
likely to have graduated. 
With a relatively few variables, our graduation model is able to predict correctly the IBRD 
graduation status of a country in a high percentage of cases.  Predicted probabilities generated by the 
model conform closely to the actual graduation and de-graduation experiences of Trinidad and 
Tobago and Korea, and suggest that Hungary and Latvia graduated prematurely – a prediction 
subsequently borne out by their return to borrowing from the IBRD in the wake of the global 
financial crisis.   
We supplement the graduation analysis with an analysis of the level of borrowing from the 
Bank, which is a continuous variable.  Interestingly, the findings are largely consistent with the 
analysis of the (discrete) graduation variable:  as countries become wealthier, develop higher-quality 
institutions, and become more creditworthy, they rely less on IBRD financing for their development 
needs.  This finding is consistent with the expectation under the policy that as the country develops, 
it will have less need for IBRD assistance and thus will be ready for graduation. 
A concern raised by these findings is about possible moral hazard effects of the IBRD 
graduation policy.  In theory, because countries with stronger institutions and higher 
creditworthiness are more likely to have graduated and to receive less financing from the Bank, 
above-threshold countries could have an incentive not to improve their ratings on those scores.  But 
in practice this is not likely to be a serious concern. Countries already theoretically face such a 
tradeoff when their per-capita incomes increase, but the benefits of increased income presumably so 
outweigh any costs in terms of reduced IBRD financing that the theoretical tradeoff is unlikely to 
enter into their calculations. Similarly, stronger institutions bring a host of benefits and higher 
creditworthiness increases access to private credit, so any perverse incentives will be outweighed by 
these benefits. As with social programs, one way to minimize any moral hazard is to withdraw a 
benefit gradually to ensure that there is no discrete cutoff at a given income level or institutional 
rating; our empirical results suggest that IBRD graduation follows this gradualist approach. Another 
approach is to provide assistance in ways designed to strengthen institutional capacity—for example, 21 
 
via technical assistance or development policy loans that include institutional reforms as prior 
actions for disbursement.
35     
   
                                                 
35 This problem is anticipated in the graduation policy.  An unpublished 1982 memorandum to the Bank’s Executive 
Directors states: “the failure of a nation to take appropriate actions” to reduce poverty does not justify delaying 
graduation.  “Assessment of a country’s seriousness in addressing problems” and “receptivity to Bank advice…will be 
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Table 1 
Graduation and Degraduation years, 1970-2008 
Country Graduation Degraduation 
    
New Zealand  1972   
Iraq
1 1973  2003 
Iceland 1974   
Venezuela 1974  1989 
Finland 1975   
Israel 1975   
Singapore 1975   
Ireland 1976   
Gabon 1977  1988 
Spain 1977   
Greece 1979   
Trinidad and Tobago 1984  1990 
Oman 1987   
Bahamas
2 1989   
Portugal 1989   
Cyprus 1992   
Barbados
3 1994   
Korea, Rep  1995  1998 
Slovenia 2004   
Czech Republic  2005   
Estonia 2006   
Lithuania 2006   
Hungary 2007   
Latvia 2007   
Slovak Republic  2008   
    
1Iraq is excluded from the analysis due to missing data on income 
2Bahamas is missing data on creditworthiness prior to 2000, so only post-graduation years are included in the analysis 
3Barbados began borrowing again in 2001, but did not officially degraduate; it is not included in the analysis due to 












Mean Min Max StdDev Mean Min Max StdDev
Graduate dummy  0.83 0 1 0.38 0.65 0 1 0.48
Borrow Dummy  0.09 0 1 0.29 0.19 0 1 0.39
IBRD borrowing per capita  2.45 0 117.70 11.17 5.69 0 117.70 16.49
GNI p.c. over threshold  14331 45 80615 12119 8477 45 51870 8564
Political Freedoms  12.3 2 14 3.1 11.7 3 14 3.1
Institutional Capacity  14.3 3.9 18 3.24 12.8 3.9 18 3.00
Credit Rating  73.3 23.6 97.30 16.20 63.3 23.6 95.30 14.7
Bank crisis dummy (last 5 years)  0.06 0 1 0.23 0.06 0 1 0.25
Small nation dummy  0.14 0 1 0.35 0.23 0 1 0.42
Herfindahl exports concentration  0.07 0.002 1 0.14 0.08 0.006 0.79 0.12
Transition dummy  0.08 0 1 0.27 0.16 0 1 .37
Time Trend (year)  1996.6 1982 2008 7.8 1997.5 1982 2008 7.9






Probit Estimates for Graduate (1=graduate, 0=non-graduate) 
 
column i  ii  iii  iv 
Sample  1 2 1 2 
Income data  ex post 
 
contemporaneous 
Constant  257.53** 242.92** 265.15** 250.30** 
  (4.89) (4.03) (4.80) (4.07) 
Log of GNI per capita  0.924** 0.843** 0.899** 0.823** 
     in excess of threshold  (4.41)  (3.52)  (4.70)  (3.82) 
Political  Freedoms  0.139** 0.158** 0.149** 0.167** 
  (2.47) (2.70) (2.62) (2.88) 
Institutional Capacity  0.160** 0.184** 0.163** 0.188** 
  (2.32) (2.14) (2.33) (2.19) 
Credit Rating  0.024*  0.014  0.022  0.011 
  (1.72) (0.92) (1.47) (0.69) 
Bank crisis in last 5 years  -1.182**    -1.483**    -1.211**    -1.518**   
     % of GDP  (-3.60)  (-3.17)  (-3.04)  (-2.68) 
Small nation  -1.338**    -1.344**    -1.408**    -1.416**   
     Dummy  (-2.52)  (-2.53)  (-2.57)  (-2.59) 
Export concentration   5.864** 5.561** 5.644** 5.312** 
  (4.35) (3.93) (4.28) (3.67) 
Transition economy  -0.180  -0.122 -0.159 -0.101 
     Dummy  (-0.28)  (-0.19)  (-0.23)  (-0.15) 
Time trend   -0.134**  -0.126** -0.137** -0.129** 
  (-5.05) (-4.17) (-4.98) (-4.22) 
Threshold as share of   -0.810 -0.986 -0.986 -1.186 
    world mean income  (-0.55)  (-0.60)  (-0.64)  (-0.68) 
      
Number of observations  906  437  884  415 
Number of nations  55  34  55  34 
Adj. pseudo-R
2  0.66 0.56 0.65 0.55 
Correctly  predicted  93.7% 87.2% 93.7% 86.8% 
 
Dependent variable is graduation status.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  A * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  Standard errors 
are adjusted for non-independence within country clusters of observations.  




Logit Estimates for Graduate (1=graduate, 0=non-graduate) 
 
 
Column i  ii  iii 
Method  logit  RE logit  FE logit 
Log of GNI per capita  5.068** 17.257**  22.624** 
     in excess of threshold  (4.11) (4.04) (2.89) 
Political Freedoms  1.273** 1.758* 4.254** 
  (2.59) (1.85) (2.69) 
Institutional Capacity  1.352** 2.683** 3.266** 
  (2.24) (3.23) (2.98) 
Credit Rating  1.048* 1.129*  1.064 
  (1.74) (1.78) (0.63) 
Bank crisis in last 5 years  0.129* 13.043  100.403** 
     % of GDP  (-3.10) (1.36) (2.02) 
Small nation  0.094** 0.066  0.001 
     Dummy  (-2.25) (-1.61) (0.01) 
Export concentration   501.681** 17159.66**  21115.49** 
  (3.29) (3.38) (2.70) 
Transition economy  0.744 0.043   
     Dummy  (-0.20) (-1.30)   
Time trend   0.782** 0.652** 0.672** 
  (-4.34) (-3.75) (-2.83) 
Threshold as share of   0.272 0.001  0.001* 
    world mean income  (-0.42) (-1.51) (-1.71) 
     
Number of observations  906  906  169 
Number of nations  55  55  14 
Pseudo-R
2  0.66 0.79 0.42 
Correctly predicted  93.8%     
 
Dependent variable is graduation status.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  Coefficients are 
converted into the change on odds ratios.   A * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  Standard errors are adjusted for non-independence 
within country clusters of observations in column (i).  The change in odds ratios for export 




Probit Estimates for Graduate with Alternative Institutional Indicators  
(1=graduate, 0=non-graduate) 
 
Column i  ii  iii  iv  v    vi 
Constant 262.27**  293.35**  204.404** 239.71**  263.68** 249.73** 
  (4.45) (5.58) (3.25) (2.83) (2.90) (3.35) 
Log of GNI per capita  0.983**  0.982** 0.841** 1.057** 1.040** 0.703** 
in excess of threshold  (4.54)  (4.55)  (3.99)  (3.36)  (3.33)  (3.43) 
Institutional Capacity  0.144*  0.141*  0.195**  0.095  0.097  0.201** 
  (1.80) (1.72) (1.72) (1.08) (1.06) (3.20) 
Democracy index  0.124**        -0.023   
(Polity)  (2.54)      (-0.23)  
Executive  constraints    0.234**      
(Polity)    (2.55)      
Tax revenue/GDP        0.088**  0.092**   
      (2.02)  (1.96)   
M2/GDP        0.014** 
        (2.64) 
Credit Rating  0.023*  0.024*  -0.131  0.057**  0.055**  0.012 
  (1.78) (1.79) (0.22) (2.63) (2.43) (0.74) 
Bank crisis in last 5 years  -1.104**    -1.089**   0.025*  -0.651    -0.628    -0.767*  
% of GDP  (-3.46) (-3.48) (1.75)  (-1.30) (-1.23) (-1.89) 
Small nation  -1.497**    -1.507**   -1.196**  -1.108    -1.272    -1.250**  
Dummy  (-2.72) (-2.74) (2.13)  (-1.56) (-1.59) (-2.06) 
Export concentration   5.675**  5.810** -1.213** 8.837**  8.378** 4.995** 
  (3.73) (3.97) (3.66) (2.54) (2.46) (2.63) 
Transition economy  -0.043  -0.070 3.700**  0.415  0.399  0.495 
Dummy  (-0.07)  (-0.11)  (2.36) (0.46) (0.44) (0.74) 
Time  trend    -0.149** -0.152** -0.107** -0.142** -0.139** -0.129** 
  (-5.46) (-5.85) (3.41)  (-3.00) (-3.06) (-3.47) 
Threshold as share of   -1.346  -1.376 -0.434 -0.363 -0.577 -1.597 
world mean income  (-0.87) (-0.88) (0.29)  (-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.93) 
Number of observations  853  853  914  455  428  581 
Number of nations  51 51 55 49 45 42 
Adj. pseudo-R
2 0.68  0.68  0.64  0.70 0.69 0.63 
Correctly  predicted  93.8% 93.7% 93.3% 92.5% 92.1% 90.2% 
 
Dependent variable is graduation status.  All regressions are based on Sample 1.  t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses.  A * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level.  Standard errors are adjusted for non-independence within country clusters of 




Probit Estimates for Graduate with Added Regressors (1=graduate, 0=non-graduate) 
 
 
column I  ii  iii  iv  v  Vi 
















Constant 262.27**  254.87**  511.46** 247.63** 488.50**  -9.094** 
  (4.45) (3.61)  (3.88) (4.74) (4.42)  (-3.79) 
Log of GNI per capita  0.312  1.187**  0.771** 0.967** 1.698**  0.870** 
in excess of threshold  (1.22)  (4.85)  (2.83)  (4.58)  (3.84)  (4.31) 
Political Freedoms  0.221**  0.197**  0.177**  0.167**  0.193*  0.121** 
  (3.28) (2.42)  (2.52) (3.11) (1.72)  (2.19) 
Institutional Capacity  0.133*  0.123*  0.273**  0.161*  0.003  0.202** 
  (1.87) (1.72)  (2.38) (2.28) (0.04)  (2.79) 
Credit Rating  0.009  0.019  0.061**  0.022*  0.031*  0.025* 
  (0.66) (1.11)  (3.13) (1.66) (1.83)  (1.83) 
Bank crisis in last 5 years  -1.097**    -1.099**   -0.954**   -1.118**    -0.986*    -1.058** 
% of GDP  (-3.36) (-2.63)  (-2.58) (-3.25) (-1.84)  (-3.05) 
Small nation  -1.463**    -1.278**   -0.890    -1.316**    -1.146**    -1.402** 
Dummy  (-2.60) (-2.48)  (-1.46) (-2.41) (-2.04)  (-2.55) 
Export concentration   6.200**  5.052** 6.943**  5.773**  2.838  6.329** 
  (4.70) (4.85)  (5.32) (4.41) (1.33)  (4.75) 
Transition economy  -0.218  -0.029  0.087 -0.129 1.069  -0.071 
Dummy  (-0.31)  (-0.04)  (0.12) (-0.19) (0.86)  (-0.10) 
Time trend   -0.147**  -0.132**  -0.260** -0.128** -0.252**  -0.078** 
  (-4.83) (-3.74)  (-3.99) (-4.90) (-4.40)  (-2.49) 
Threshold as share of   -1.385  -0.860 -5.258*  -0.759 -2.831  -0.157 
world mean income  (-0.87) (-0.55)  (-1.67) (-0.52) (-1.27)  (-0.11) 
Added regressor  3.023**  -0.115  0.007  -0.017  0.081  0.004** 
  (3.35) (-0.07)  (0.02) (-0.08) (1.36) (2.80) 
Number of observations  904  880  605  906  734  906 
Number of nations  54 53  51 55 45  55 
Adj. pseudo-R
2  0.69 0.69  0.78 0.67 0.76  0.68 
Correctly  predicted  93.9% 94.1%  96.7% 93.7% 95.2%  94.2% 
 
Dependent variable is graduation status.  All regressions are based on Sample 1.  t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses.  A * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level.  Standard errors are adjusted for non-independence within country clusters of 
observations.   30 
 
Table 7 
Probit Estimates for Decision to Borrow (1=borrow, 0=not borrow in given year) 
 
Column i  ii  iii 
Sample 1  1  2 
Constant -117.68**  -77.56  -100.50** 
  (-2.17) (-0.95) (-1.76) 
Log of GNI per capita  -0.474**  0.505**  -0.406** 
     in excess of threshold  (-2.70)  (2.07)  (-2.22) 
Political Freedoms  -0.070  -0.211**  -0.093* 
 (-1.34)  (-3.85)  (1.62) 
Institutional Capacity  -0.134**  0.025  -0.153** 
  (-2.27) (0.46) (-2.12) 
Credit Rating  -0.042**  -0.020  -0.036* 
  (-2.21) (-1.37) (-1.83) 
Bank crisis in last 5 years  0.093    0.541    0.187   
     % of GDP  (0.23)  (1.25)  (0.46) 
Small nation  -0.352    0.132    -0.424   
     Dummy  (-0.74)  (0.26)  (-0.82) 
Export  concentration    -7.214** -7.972** -7.477** 
  (-4.06) (-3.39) (-3.78) 
Transition economy  -0.743 -0.270 -0.728 
     Dummy  (-1.47)  (-0.54)  (-1.46) 
Time trend   0.063**  0.073*  0.054* 
  (2.33) (1.78) (1.89) 
Threshold as share of   -1.434  -0.999  -1.500 
    world mean income  (-1.01)  (-0.40)  (-1.02) 
Log of GDP per capita     -7.404**   
constant dollars (PPP)    (-4.89)   
Number of observations  906  904  437 
Number of nations  55  54  34 
Adj. pseudo-R
2  0.53 0.69 0.41 
Correctly  predicted  94.5% 95.5% 88.8% 
 
Dependent variable is borrowing status, equal to 1 for countries receiving new loans during the year 
and 0 otherwise.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  A * indicates significance at the 10 percent 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.  Standard errors are adjusted for non-
independence within country clusters of observations.  
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Table 8 
Tobit Estimates for Log IBRD borrowed amount per capita 
 
Column i  ii  iii  iv  v 
Sample  1 1 2 3 4 
Method tobit  RE  tobit  tobit  tobit  tobit 
Constant -390.40**    -362.97**  6.10  76.44* 
 (-3.19)    (-2.67)  (0.12)  (1.74) 
Log of GNI per capita  -4.481**  -2.986*** -4.148**  -0.523**  -0.491** 
  (-3.62) (-3.15) (-3.04) (-2.02) (-2.04) 
Over IBRD threshold        -1.148**  -1.844** 
     Dummy        (-1.94)  (-2.87) 
Log of IDA borrowing per         -1.587**  -1.393** 
   Capita        (-4.19)  (-5.87) 
Over IDA threshold          2.186** 
    Dummy          (3.58) 
Political Freedoms  -0.190  -0.153 -0.215 0.018  0.024 
 (-1.56)  (-1.10)  (-1.59)  (0.29)  (0.48) 
Institutional Capacity  -0.128  -0.063 -0.132 -0.097  -0.141** 
  (-0.85) (-0.52) (-0.78) (-1.26) (-2.20) 
Credit Rating  -0.086**  -0.088** -0.081** -0.034**  -0.006 
  (-2.15) (-2.55) (-2.01) (-1.94) (-0.40) 
Bank crisis in last 5 years  1.170    -0.182    1.179    0.308  0.318   
     % of GDP  (1.38)  (-0.27)  (1.39)  (1.06)  (1.17) 
Small nation  -0.421    -0.243    -0.151    -0.789    -0.597   
     Dummy  (-0.03)  (-0.21)  (-0.11)  (-1.51)  (-1.10) 
Export concentration   -18.816**  -14.962** -18.318**  -3.234**  -3.363** 
  (-3.73) (-3.70) (-3.72) (-2.83) (-3.54) 
Transition economy  -1.540  0.323 -1.528 0.611 0.712* 
     Dummy  (-1.59)  (0.26)  (-1.59)  (1.50)  (1.82) 
Time  trend    0.220** 0.082 0.205** 0.001  -0.035 
  (3.51) (1.48) (2.92) (0.05) (-1.61) 
Threshold as share of   -3.370  -2.980 -3.316 -0.875 -0.843 
    world mean income  (-1.02)  (-1.21)  (-0.98)  (-0.93)  (-0.97) 
Number of observations  906  906  437  1567  2020 
Number censored observations  824 824 355 968  1330 
Number of nations  55  55  34  96  124 
Adj. pseudo-R
2 0.38  .65  0.27  0.21  0.21 
 
Dependent variable is log of per capita IBRD borrowing.  t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  A * 
indicates significance at the 10 percent level, and ** at the 5 percent level.  Standard errors are 









Over IDA operational cutoff   
(N=1567) 
Sample 4 
All IBRD members  
(N=2020) 
Mean Min Max StdDev Mean Min Max StdDev
Graduate dummy  0.41 0 1 0.49 0.32 0 1 0.47
Borrow Dummy  0.38 0 1 0.49 0.34 0 1 0.47
IBRD borrowing per capita  5.76 0 168.15 12.76 4.65 0 168.15 11.49
IDA borrowing per capita  0.42 0 40.72 2.8 1.78 0 46.72 4.92
Over IBRD threshold  0.50 0 1 0.50 0.38 0 1 0.49
Over IDA threshold  1.00 0 1 0 0.78 0 1 0.42
GNI per capita (current US $)  11698 650 87340 12920 9183 120 87340 12304
Political Freedoms  10.7 2 14 3.5 10.0 2 14 3.6
Institutional Capacity  11.6 3 18 3.7 10.7 2 18 3.8
Transition dummy  0.14 0 1 0.35 0.12 0 1 0.32
Credit Rating  55.5 7.9 96.40 16.20 48.4 4.6 96.4 25.1
Small Country dummy  0.09 0 1 0.29 0.07 0 1 0.26
Bank crisis dummy (1
st 5 years)  0.12 0 1 0.33 0.14 0 1 0.34
Herfindahl exports concentration  0.10 0.002 1 0.16 0.11 0.002 1 0.16
Threshold as share of world mean   0.93 0.725 1.07 0.11 0.93 0.725 1.07 0.11






Predicted graduation probability vs. actual graduation, selected countries 
 
 
 